Any cancer research funds are fraudulent

A world without cancer. The story of vitamin B17 and its suppression

by Laura S.

THIS BOOK SHOULD BE PRESENTED IN THIS BOOK the numerous pieces of evidence supporting the thesis that cancer is a deficiency disease. It is not caused by any bacterium, virus or mysterious poison, but by the lack of a substance that the ... More

THIS BOOK SHOULD BE PRESENTED IN THIS BOOK the numerous pieces of evidence supporting the theory that cancer is a deficiency disease. It is not caused by any bacterium, virus, or enigmatic poison, but rather by the lack of a substance that modern man has excluded from his diet. If this analysis is correct, then cure and prevention of cancer is a simple matter. We just have to give this easily available and inexpensive food component a place in our daily diet. Less

Read the publication

1st edition October 2005 Copyright © 1974, 1997 by G. Edward Griffin Copyright © 2005 for the German-language edition by Jochen Kopp Verlag, Pfeiferstraße 52, D-72108 Rottenburg Title of the American original edition: World Without Cancer From the American by the translation agency Aldea, Cologne / Angelika Orpin All rights reserved. Editing: Dr. Renate Oettinger Cover design: ZERO advertising agency, Munich Typesetting and layout: Agency Pegasus, Zella-Mehlis Printed in Germany ISBN 3-938516-15-1 We would be happy to send you our publishing directory Kopp Verlag Pfeiferstraße 52 D-72108 Rottenburg E-Mail: info @ kopp Tel .: (0 74 72) 98 06-0 Fax: (0 74 72) 98 06-11 You can also find our book program on the Internet at:

Warning! THIS BOOK SHOULD present the numerous pieces of evidence supporting the thesis that cancer is a deficiency disease. It is not caused by any bacterium, virus, or enigmatic poison, but rather by the lack of a substance that modern man has excluded from his diet. If this analysis is correct, then cure and prevention of cancer is a simple matter. We just have to give this easily available and inexpensive food component a place in our daily diet. This theory is very interesting. It contains the promise that we can create a cancer-free world now - not in any distant future - and it would also mean that the billions of dollars spent each year on research and medical treatment will go to better endeavors Of course, it would also mean that the one million or so professionals who are currently making a good living in the cancer research, cancer therapy and fundraising industries would be out of work very quickly. This is where the story gets interesting because they are the very same people we reached out to for an expert opinion on the benefits of Laetrile, a nutritional therapy. It should come as no surprise to us that these professionals have rejected the concept of cancer as a vitamin deficiency disease. You have none of it. A world without cancer would not only be a financial shock to her, it would also deal a severe blow to her professional prestige. Just imagine: A cure for cancer is found in the seeds of fruits, not in research laboratories, nor by people without government research funds and without representative diplomas on the wall! Organized medicine spoke. She calls Laetrile quackery and ridicules it as a cancer treatment "with no proven effect." But this term should be considered a little more closely. For most people, "not proven" simply means that there is no evidence. But what is evidence? It's not an absolute term. There is no proof in the strict sense, there is only evidence. If the evidence appears convincing to the observer, then it is referred to as evidence, and the thesis that comes with it

4 is considered to be "proven". If a second observer does not find the same evidence convincing, then it is not evidence and the thesis is "not proven" for that observer. As we shall see in the following pages, there is a great deal of evidence supporting the concept of cancer as a vitamin deficiency disease - more than enough to convince most people that the thesis is proven. But at the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) the term “proven” means something completely different. It's a technical definition. If the FDA describes the effect of a therapy as "proven", this only means that the provider has fulfilled the requirements for the test set-up to demonstrate safety and effectiveness. To do this, however, one must know that - contrary to the actual meaning of the word - the successful completion of the experiments does not mean that the therapy is also safe and effective. It just means that the trials were conducted, that the results were evaluated, and that the FDA granted marketing authorization, often despite poor results. If cancer patients undergoing these FDA-proven therapies read the lab reports, they would run away in horror. The reports show neither safety nor effectiveness, and in reality they are not supposed to. They are only supposed to determine the lethal dose - the point at which the therapy kills 50 percent of patients - and also the ratio of those for whom it works to those for whom it does not. The ratio is often only eight or nine out of a hundred. In addition, "benefit" can mean any small improvement, such as a temporary reduction in the size of the tumor. It practically never means a complete cure. If anything is "shown" by these studies, it is that most of the FDA-approved cancer therapies are neither safe nor effective. Then there is the financial aspect. The experimental set-ups required by the FDA are costly. The providers of a new therapy have to employ a lot of technical staff and compile many thousands of pages of statistics. The finished reports often weigh several hundred pounds and result in a stack of papers nearly two meters high. The process can take years and cost more than two hundred million dollars per study.

5 Only the big pharmaceutical companies can keep up with this game. (Although they publicly complain about these costs, they are secretly in favor of it, because it prevents competition from smaller companies.) The possible profit from introducing one new drug on the world market is worth the investment. But who would be willing to invest such amounts in a product that is not patentable? There is no patent protection for naturally occurring substances, only for those invented by man. If a company spent two hundred million dollars getting a natural substance approved by the FDA, its competitors could offer the product as well, and there would be no way for the product developer to recoup the investment. Therefore - and this should be well remembered - if the legal situation remains as it is, only patented substances will ever be "approved" for cancer therapy. No natural substance will ever be legally available for the treatment of cancer or any other disease unless a monopoly on its source can be obtained or the processing method is patentable. No matter how harmless or effective it may be, it will forever be relegated to the category of therapies "without proven effect". And so the regulation, distribution and in many cases even the use of remedies that nature freely makes available will always be prohibited. This is one of the reasons why the following warning and disclaimer are given. But even without such a background, it is common sense that cancer patients exercise extreme caution in their choice of therapy. It is therefore pointed out that Laetrile is officially a cancer drug with no proven effect. The author of this book is a researcher and publicist, not a doctor. The facts presented on the following pages are for informational purposes only, not medical advice. They should provide the basis for a declaration of consent. While there are many preventive measures that each of us can do, self-treatment is not advisable for clinical cancer. Any cancer therapy, including nutritional therapy, should be carried out under the supervision of qualified health professionals who are specialists in their field.

G. Edward Griffin A World Without Cancer The Story of Vitamin B17 and Its Suppression

Dedication D I E S E S B U C H IST TO THE memory of Dr. Ernst T. Krebs junior and Dr. med. Dedicated to John A. Richardson. Even the power and malice of ingrained scientific errors did not make them shrink back. While others took cover, they stood in the front line of the battle. May the description of their deeds help to awaken the public, who are the only ones who can break the violence that their enemies still wield over our lives and health.

Short Acknowledgments THE M A T E R I A L FOR THIS book could not have been compiled without the help and input of many other people. The late Dr. I owe thanks to John A. Richardson for persistently preaching the importance of vitamin therapy to me until it finally penetrated that stubborn skull, and to my wife Patricia for trying months before my interest in this one Awakening topic. The late Dr. I owe Ernst T. Krebs junior eternal thanks for the patience and thoroughness with which he explained so many scientific facts to me again and again. I thank Bruce Buchbinder, Ralph Bowman, Malvina Cassese, Frank Cortese, George Ham, Grace Hamilton, Jim Foley, Mac and Idell Hays, Pokie Korsgaard, Sanford Kraemer, Dr. J. Milton Hoffman, Maurice LeCover, Bob Lee, Betty Lee Morales, Beverly Newkirk, John Pursely, Julie Richardson, Bob Riddel, Lorraine Rosenthal, Alice Tucker, Lloyd Wallace, MP Wehling, Kimo Welch, Melinda Wiman, Ann Yalian and so many others that I cannot name them here for their great encouragement, infinite patience and tangible support.

Table of contents Part one Cancer therapy and science FOREWORD - p. 17 Chapter 1: THE WATERGATE SYNDROME - p. 25 Unfairness and corruption in drug research, examples of the "worthlessness" of Laetrile (vitamin B17) in a first larger study, Evidence of fraudulent conduct in the course of the study, prohibition of the use of Laetrile due to lack of examination and denial of any examination approval by the FDA (except for anti-Laetrile). Chapter 2: GENEINE MURDER IN MANHATTAN - P. 44 Further attempts by the cancer industry to prove the worthlessness of Laetrile, embezzlement of laboratory reports from the Sloan Chainng Institute showing the effectiveness of Laetrile, Rockefeller and its connection to the pharmaceutical industry, and how a group of Sloan Kettering employees let the world know the truth. Chapter 3: AN APPLE EVERY DAY - P. 63 Persistent Scientific Errors in Human History, Dr. Ernst T. Krebs junior and his concept of cancer as a vitamin deficiency disease, developed in 1952, as well as an overview of the examples from nature and human history that confirm the concept. Chapter 4: THE FINAL TEST - P. 73 A look at the many cultures in the world that are or have been cancer-free and an analysis of their local foods.

Chapter 5: CANCER - THE ABUNDANCE OF LIFE - p. 85 An explanation of the trophoblastic thesis of carcinogenesis, description of a simple urine test for cancer, appreciation of the BCG vaccine as an active ingredient against cancer and a description of the crucial role of the pancreas in controlling cancer. Chapter 6: THE OVERALL MECHANISM - P. 97 Nutrients as the support of the enzymes, the life of Dr. Ernst T. Krebs junior and the development of Laetrile, the positive effects of vitamin B17 on a wide variety of human diseases and the complexity of the natural defense against cancer. Chapter 7: ANIME MAKING WITH CYANIDE - p. 107 Newspaper report about a couple who allegedly had been poisoned with apricot kernels, detailed examination of the facts on this case, assessment of the toxic potential of seeds containing B17 and the clinical proof that Laetrile is less toxic than Sugar. Chapter 8: THE LAETRIL "QUACKSALVER" - p. 117 Names, positions, medical merits, and clinical results of some of the better known physicians advocating the use of Laetrile, positive side effects of Laetrile, suggested cancer diet, and a brief description of vitamin B15. Chapter 9: CANCER PRODUCTS "WITHOUT PROVEN EFFECT" - p. 128 Clinical evidence for trophoblast thesis, laboratory tests show the destruction of cancer cells by Laetrile, case histories of terminally ill cancer patients who attribute their recovery to the effects of Laetrile. Chapter 10: CANCER PRODUCTS "WITH PROVEN EFFECT" - p. 153 The effect of surgery and radiation in cancer treatment and a comparison that shows that untreated patients survive as long or even longer than treated patients.

Chapter 11: A NEW DIMENSION OF MURDER - P. 171 Cancer drugs ineffective and carcinogenic, FDA-approved human experiments result in deaths from the drugs, not from cancer. Chapter 12: A STATISTICAL COMPARISON - p. 189 Systematic weaknesses of all cancer statistics, need for statistical comparisons despite these weaknesses, comparison of the results achieved by orthodox and laetrile doctors and the consequences of consensus medicine. Part two Cancer therapy and politics Chapter 13: CARTELS - ESCAPE FROM COMPETITION ... - p. 201 Overview of the scientific aspects of cancer therapy, summary of the political aspects of cancer therapy, the beginnings of the chemical and pharmaceutical cartel IG Farben, the first successes of the cartel in the USA and its "marriage" to DuPont, Standard Oil and Ford. Chapter 14: THE SUPERMONOPOLY - p. 219 Early examples of cartel support for totalitarian regimes, the contribution of the LG. Farben on Hitler's rise out of political insignificance and the transformation of the Nazi state into a stooge of the cartels. Chapter 15: WAR GAMES - p. 230 Preparations of German industry for the Second World War, the continuous support of American industrialists for IG Farben and the Nazi regime during this time, as well as the profitable role of Ford and ITT in war production for Nazi Germany and the USA.

Chapter 16: CONSPIRACY - p. 240 Attempts to camouflage the property of IG Farben in American companies, support from the Rockefeller holdings, infiltration of the US government by representatives of the Cartel and the settlement of Case 1. G. Farben . Chapter 17: THE ROCKEFELLER GROUP - p. 258 A brief biography of John D. Rockefeiler Sr. and his crusade against free enterprise, the beginnings of Standard Oil, the Rockefellers' entry into investment banking and their influence on the pharmaceutical industry and international politics . Chapter 18: THE CHARITY RECIPE - P. 279 The Impact of the Pharmaceutical Cartel on Medical Schools in the United States, the Pharmaceutical Orientation of Medical Education, and How Charitable Foundations Can Control Educational Institutions. Chapter 19: WESS 'BREAD I ESS ... - p. 293 The low level of medical education in the USA before 1910, the contribution of the Flexner Report to the dramatization of the need for reform, the role of the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations in the implementation of the Flexner Report and the use of foundation funds to secure control over the medical schools in the USA. Chapter 20: ... DESS'S SONG I SING - p. 303 The influence of the AMA on medical practice in the USA, lack of control of the AMA by its members, funding of the AMA by the pharmaceutical industry and examples of the interdependence between the two. Chapter 21: THE PROTECTION BUSINESS - p.311 Cartel agents in the FDA and other government agencies, the CFR as a structure for overseeing US foreign policy, scientific incompetence at the FDA and the growing power of the FDA.

Chapter 22: THE ARSENAL OF SUBMISSION - p. 329 State harassment against the dietary supplement and vitamin industry, publicity against Laetrile in the media and a cost comparison between Laetrile therapy and orthodox cancer therapies. Chapter 23: TWO MEASUREMENTS - p. 340 An analysis of the FDA's different scales in which harmless, non-pharmaceutical substances such as vitamins and nutritional supplements are subject to stricter restrictions than toxic and dangerous drugs.Chapter 24: ON THE HIGH ROPE - p. 354 Methods of intimidation against the use of Laetrile, reasons for the pharmaceutical industry's search for a patentable alternative to Laetrile, and the courageous opposition of Laetrile doctors to the FDA. Chapter 25: THE QUESTION OF THE MOTIF - p. 369 The motives of the opponents of Laetrile Therapy, the theories of a "limited" or "total" conspiracy and the counter-movement at the base as the force of change. Chapter 26: A WORLD WITHOUT CANCER - p. 391 More research is needed on vitamin B17, the laetrile controversy as opposed to medical controversies of the past, an analogy between biological and political cancer and a scenario of how both could be defeated together . ILLUSTRATIONS PART ONE - P. 145-152 ILLUSTRATION PART TWO - P. 271-278 LITERATURE LIST - P. 403 REGISTER - P. 407

Foreword S E I T THE PUBLICATION OF THE first edition of this book, many dramas were staged on the Krebsbühne. Many of the original actors have since been replaced by a new cast, but the plot of the play remains unchanged. What follows is a brief synopsis. Every year, thousands of Americans travel to Mexico or Germany for Laetrile treatment. You are doing this because it has been banned in the United States. Most of these patients were told that their cancer was terminal and that they had only a few months to live. Yet an incredibly high percentage of these patients have recovered and lead normal lives. Even so, the FDA, AMA, American Cancer Society, and cancer research centers continue to refer to Laetrile as quackery. The recovered patients, they claim, either had "spontaneous remission" or had no cancer at all. If any of these people do die after being treated with Laetrile, the representatives of orthodox medicine will rush to announce, “You see? Laetrile doesn't work! «Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of patients die every year after operations, radiation or chemotherapy, and yet these treatment methods are still touted as» safe and effective «. A cancer patient treated with Laetrile will pay an average of $ 5,000 to $ 25,000 for treatment. That is a lot of money, but it is a ridiculous sum compared to the astronomical calculations of the representatives of orthodox medicine. Yet they never tire of complaining that laetril doctors are greedy quacks and charlatans who take advantage of sick and frightened people. This is a classic example of the method of accusing your opponent of what you are doing yourself. It is now quite common for an elderly couple to toss all their savings at a medical facility and the phalanx of attending physicians and technicians in the vain hope of saving their husbands or wives from cancer. Sometimes they even have to sell their house to pay for treatment costs. And worst of all, in most cases doctors know very well that in the long run

18 there is no hope of success. The surviving spouse rarely experiences this. The next time you hear an Orthodox medicine representative rail against these greedy laetrile doctors, follow him into the parking lot. Chances are he's driving away in his new Jaguar. The only difference between the current controversy and its beginnings in the 1970s is that the media has lost interest in it. The rarity of the reports has created the false impression that Laetrile has fallen out of favor, but nothing could be less true. The number of patients treated with Laetrile is still in the thousands today. It has been alleged that the mass media chose to ignore Laetrile because it had become so popular with national coverage. People decided to give it a try, despite the negative press reports. Why not if they'd been told they were going to die anyway? And the clinics in Mexico were thriving. Another reason may be that while the controversy continues, there is nothing really new in terms of content. Each subsequent episode is just another extension of the earlier forces and arguments. For example, in 1977 Chad Green's parents kidnapped their own son and traveled with him to Mexico so that the Massachusetts authorities could not force them to have him treated with chemotherapy for his leukemia. Instead, they wanted nutritional therapy. That is part of the high price we pay for allowing the state to decide what is best for us and our families. When certain interest groups become strong enough to dictate the law, it is these groups who tell us what to do - all for our own protection, of course. The story of Chad Green hit the headlines, but unfortunately the same thing has happened to many other children since, and the media has only marginally covered it. For example, in 1999 James and Donna Navarro learned that their four-year-old son, Thomas, had a malignant brain tumor. After an operation, the child was blind, unable to speak or walk. When the doctors told the Navarros that Thomas would also need radiation and chemotherapy, they researched the medical literature and found

19 suggested that these treatments would probably damage the boy's brain function even more and that he would probably not survive long anyway. So they decided to try an alternative treatment method called antineoplastons, which was offered at the Stanislaw R. Burzynsky Research Institute in Houston. At that point the FDA stepped in and banned Dr. Burzynsky to take the boy in as a patient if he had not been treated with chemotherapy and radiation beforehand. Mr. Navarro explains, "What they don't understand is that there will be nothing left of him that can be saved if we let him undergo this horrible therapy first." When he refused to obey the doctors, he became staff members of the hospital bothered with phone calls. An oncologist threatened to report him. When Mr. Navarro continued to refuse, the doctor contacted child welfare and reported the parents for child abuse. In 1980, film actor Steve McQueen also made headlines when he traveled to Mexico for laetrile treatment and other unorthodox therapies. When he died four months later after an operation, the press reported with relish that Laetrile hadn't worked. What she did not report was the fact that McQueen's cancer was actually cured and only a benign tumor remained in his abdomen. (Most tumors are a mixture of cancerous tissue and other tissue.) McQueen was feeling great and decided to have the swelling removed for cosmetic reasons. It was an incident in that operation, not the cancer he died of. There was nothing in the reports of the major press that he had recovered before the operation. Hence, thousands of Americans following the story got the impression that Laetrile was just a hoax again. Again, this is just another offshoot of the partisan reporting that has become an integral part of the media coverage of Laetrile. It continues to this day. The most notable example of continuity was the so-called scientific tests carried out by major cancer research centers to determine whether Laetrile is working or is dizzy. Both the Mayo Clinic and the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center played a major role in this act. The evidence of dirty machinations that rose from the smoking debris of these actions is so shocking.

It is clear that I have added a whole new chapter to this issue to illustrate it. You should definitely read this part even if you read nothing else in this book. It will change your view of the integrity of US medical research, to say the least. But even that was a continuation of the use of pseudoscientific methods to defend covert economic interests, which was already common practice in the 1970s. So, for all that has happened since this book was first published, the main features of the story remain unchanged. Unfortunately, hardly any revision was necessary to bring it up to date. The prospects for free choice in cancer therapy are still poor. I still remember hearing the word Laetrile for the first time in the summer of 1971. The late Dr. John Richardson and I were on a short vacation in Oregon together and really wanted to enjoy the natural beauty of the state. I wanted to say because the good doctor, who was a very strong personality, had brought his briefcase. There was no fishing tackle in it. Rather, it contained an almost inexhaustible supply of correspondence, research articles, and books, all on the unobvious subject of "L-mandelonitrile beta-glucuroniside in human cancer treatment." At first I was as interested in that as the problem of residual stress in girder bridge constructions. These are certainly fascinating topics for doctors and engineers, whose professions revolve around the intricacies of the relevant theories and formulas. I found, however, that the green of the forest and the rush of the brook deserved my attention much more, and after a while my impatience probably became evident. But my steadfast companion could not be shaken off any more than a bulldog that has only just bitten into the seat of a pants. And he insisted that I read a draft manuscript that he had written and was hoping to publish in a magazine someday. While reading this manuscript, I learned for the first time that, despite the overwhelming evidence that vitamin therapy is effective in treating cancer, there are clearly strong forces that are trying to keep this fact from becoming known. I reacted just like most people when they were first confronted with this claim.

21 and remember how I asked skeptically, “Who are you, John? Who in the world would have an interest in withholding a cure for cancer? ”That question finally piqued my interest, and although I would certainly not have believed it at the time, I was already on my way to research that would uncover one the most amazing stories of the 20th century. The ambitious aim of this book is to portray at least the high points of this story and to provide an answer to the question, "Who are you, John?" G. Edward Griffin


Chapter 1 The Watergate Syndrome Unfairness and corruption in drug research, examples of the “worthlessness” of Laetrile (vitamin Bl7) in a first larger study, evidence of fraudulent conduct within the scope of the study, ban on the use of Laetrile due to lack of testing and denial of any approval by the FDA (except for Laetril opponents). This year 550,000 Americans will die of cancer. One in three of us will develop cancer at some point in our life. That’s 88 million people in the US alone. This investigation aims to show that this immense human tragedy can be stopped - now, only on the basis of scientific knowledge that is already available. We will investigate the theory that cancer is a deficiency disease such as scurvy or pellagra, exacerbated by the lack of an essential ingredient in modern man's diet, and that ultimately cancer is manageable for this alone that this substance will again become a daily part of our diet. What you will read below does not find the endorsement of organized medicine. The American Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the American Cancer Society, and the American Medical Association have labeled it a fraud and quackery. In fact, the FDA and other government agencies have used all means at their disposal to prevent this story from being told. You have arrested citizens for holding public meetings to tell others what they think about the matter. They confiscated films and books. They even prosecuted doctors who used these theories to save their patients' lives. This surveillance mentality, which was bluntly developed in 1971 by Grant Leake, the head of the fraud division of the food and pharmaceuticals

26 California Authority, operates according to the motto: "We will protect you, even if some of you may not want to." 1 In early 1974, the California Medical Association showed Dr. Stewart M. Jones for the use of Laetrile in the treatment of cancer patients. However, it later emerged that Dr. Julius Levine, one of the members of the Chamber, had used Laetrile himself in the treatment of his own cancer. When the case of Dr. Jones came to the exam, the political pressure was so great that Dr. Levine was forced to resign from his position in the chamber instead of Dr. Publicly support Jones and his patients. 2 This is happening in a country that boasts of its liberal order and has made the Statue of Liberty its symbol. For the first time in our history, people are forced to flee our shores as medical emigrants in search of freedom of choice and self-determination over their own bodies. Laetrile has been in Australia, Brazil, Belgium, Costa Rica, Germany, England, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, Russia, Venezuela for some time and Vietnam available - but in the "land of the free" it is forbidden. Yet many doctors have defied the bureaucracy and proven in their own clinics that the concept of cancer as a vitamin deficiency disease is correct. With research spending of many billions of dollars annually, billions more from selling drugs to cancer patients, and the promises of more and more government programs to attract votes, we find ourselves in a situation today where more people earn a living with cancer than die from it. If the solution to the riddle were a simple vitamin, this gigantic commercial and political industry would be destroyed and vanished from the scene overnight. As a result, the scientific side of cancer therapy is not nearly as complicated as the political one. If the Watergate scandal of the 1970s had any positive effect, it was the fact that the public finally understood that government officials are not necessarily telling the truth. 1 "Debate Over Laetrile," Time, April 12, 1971, p. 20. 2 "Laetrile Tiff, State Medic Out," San Jose Mervury (Calif.), April 10, 1974.

27 And if caught doing such "swindles", they will inevitably claim that they only lied to protect national security, the health of the population, or some other noble good. This Watergate Syndrome is nothing new. A few years ago, an FDA official who testified in court against a Kansas City businessman confessed to cross-examination that he had lied 28 times under oath. When asked if he regretted it, he replied, “No. I regret nothing. I wouldn't hesitate to tell the truth if it would benefit the American consumer. ”3 The FDA is not exactly squeamish about its tactics“ for the benefit of the American consumer ”. If an entrepreneur falls out of favor with the authorities, they have no mercy, and the law is not a reason for attack, but a n g r i f f s w a f f e. In other words, the FDA isn't stepping because the law tells it to. It intervenes because it wants to intervene and, in retrospect, seeks justification in the law. In the famous US case against Dextra Fortified Sugar, for example, the FDA had ruled that fortifying sugar with vitamins and minerals and continuing to refer to it as sugar constituted a "misleading branding" case. The court ruled differently, however, and stated: The fundamental weakness in the state's reasoning is that it uses an advertisement for misleading product names as a pretext to enforce a ban on the sale of a product, solely for the reason that that he does not approve of their use. As a rule, there is much more to these cases than the mere zeal of some bureaucrats. The pretext "protection of the public" is the most popular cover for other, hidden motifs.In the case of draft laws that allegedly serve to protect consumer interests, representatives of the very industries against which the consumer is supposed to be protected are in charge. Politicians grateful for financial support from these industries are only too happy to put their names under such a legislative proposal and sit down 3 Omar Garrison, The Dictocrats (Chicago / London / Melbourne: Books for Today, Ltd., 1970 ), P. 130.

28 for its adoption. Once it has become law, it only serves to protect supporting industries from competition. The consumer is the victim, not the beneficiary. In the medical field, this is just as true as in any other field. However, in medicine there is also the need to maintain the appearance of scientificity. That is why not only politicians have to be won over, but scientists also have to be brought on board - which is easy to achieve through the strategic allocation of research funds. This fact was revealed in 1966 by former FDA director James L. Goddard in a speech to the Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry. He expressed concern about improper conduct in the testing of new medicines by saying: I am shocked at the material that is being presented to us. In addition to the problem of inadequate quality, there is also the problem of unfair methods in the use of drugs in the context of testing. I admit that there are gray areas in clinical trials prior to the approval of new drugs, but the deliberate concealment of unfavorable clinical data from animal experiments is not one of these gray areas. Nor does it include the conscious selection of clinical examiners, who are known more for their desire for good relationships with industry than for their interest in the compilation of meaningful data. 4 Goddard's successor at the FDA was Dr. Herbert Ley. In a testimony to a Senate committee in 1969, he described several cases of blatant drug proving fraud. In one case, a medical professor reviewed 24 drugs for nine companies. Dr. Ley said: Patients who died during the trial were not reported to the investigator ... The deceased were listed as trial subjects. Subjects identified as 4 See Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1976, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 1976, Part II, p. 157.

29 patients were not in the hospital at the time of the exams. Patient consent forms had dates that clearly indicated that they had been completed after the person's death. 5 Another case involved a commercial drug testing company that had worked on 82 drugs from 28 companies. Dr. Ley continued: Patients who died, were discharged from hospital, or dropped out of the study were replaced with other patients without being recorded on the files. 41 patients listed as participants in the study had died or were not in hospital during the study period. . . In general, documentation, supervision and patient observation were completely inadequate. 6 It turned out that between 1977 and 1980 clinical data were presented to the FDA by 62 doctors that had either been tampered with or completely falsified. 7 In a study conducted by the FDA itself, it was found that one in five physicians screened - physicians researching the effects of new drugs - invented the reported results and pocketed the trial fee. 8 These are not exceptional or isolated cases. John Braithwaite, a criminologist at the Australian Institute of Criminology (and also former Australian Competition Officer) notes, “The problem is that most clinical trial fraud is unlikely to be detected. If a case gets to the public, it is usually only due to the extraordinary negligence of the criminal doctor. «9 According to Dr. Judith Jones, former director of the FDA's Division of Drug Experience, it is not uncommon for a 5 U.S. Senate, Competitive Problems in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1969, Parts 6, 7, and 10; quoted from John Braithwaite, Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 52. 6 Ibid. 7 Braithwaite, op. Cit., P. 53. 8 Science, 1973, vol. 180, p. 1038. 9 Braithwaite, op. Cit ,. P. 54.

30 companies for which a research institute does not certify the safety and efficacy of a drug, the report in question disappears in the drawer and the drug continues to test until a facility is found that delivers the desired results. Negative reports are rarely published and clinicians are pressured to remain silent about them. 1 0 The incentive for clinical investigators to just make up data is enormous. American pharmaceutical companies pay up to $ 1,000 per patient, which means that some doctors can make up to $ 1,000,000 a year from drug trials - all the more effortless if the treatments are not given at all. Even if the tests are not made up, there is still a risk of unconscious bias. The doctors in question know that the prospects of further orders are significantly reduced if they do not deliver the results desired by the pharmaceutical companies. It is not difficult to imagine that commercial testing companies can be corrupted by money. However, it is often assumed that university laboratories are different, immune to the gains that can be made from criminal science. In reality, the voice of money is as loud on campus as it is anywhere else. Referring to an FDA research, Dr. Braithwaite: As was hardly to be expected after the above description of the possibilities of the pharmaceutical industry to steal from the responsibility for faultless research through the use of contract laboratories, a far higher number of violations of the GLP [Good Laboratory Practice] was determined in contract laboratories - as in your own laboratories. The highest number, however, was found in university laboratories. This result should be treated with extreme caution, as only five university laboratories were involved in the study. Nevertheless, it should defeat the automatic assumption that university researchers - with their alleged independence from the pursuit of profit - are hardly lacking in scientific knowledge. "10 Arabella Melville and Colin Johnson, Cured to Death; The Effects of Prescription Drugs (New York: Stein & Day, 1982), pp. 119. 11 Braithwaite, op.cit., P. 82.

The trace of corruption leads back to the FDA itself. A study conducted by USA TO DA Y showed that over half of the experts hired by the government to advise on drug safety and effectiveness have financial ties with the pharmaceutical companies that are affected by their opinion. The report found: These experts are tasked with advising the FDA on which drugs should receive marketing authorization, what should be in the warnings and how drug tests should be designed. These experts are said to be independent, but USA TODAY found that about 54 percent of the time, they have an immediate financial interest in the drug or issue being assessed. These conflicts include participation in the development of the drug and later membership on an FDA advisory board that evaluates the drug. Typical points of conflict are share ownership, consultancy fees or research funding. 1 2 What exactly does this mean in the case of cancer? Science can not only be used to bring ineffective drugs onto the market, but also to keep effective drugs out of the market - because the latter represent potential competition for the pharmaceutical industry, which controls the approval process for drugs. The controversy surrounding Dr. Andrew Ivy, cancer drug Krebiozen, is an example of this phenomenon. Before joining the FDA in the early 1960s, Ivy had been widely recognized as one of the country's foremost medical professionals. As head of the University of Illinois' Clinical Sciences Department, he had 350 Ph. D. and M. Sc. Candidates . educated. He was one of the representatives of the USA at the Nuremberg Trials after the Second World War. The American Medical Association awarded him bronze, silver, and gold medals in recognition of his excellence in medicine. He had published over a thousand articles in scientific and medical journals. In fact, the FDA itself often had it as a medical 12 "FDA advisers tied to industry," USA TODAY, September 25, 2000, p. 1 A.

32 experts used in court hearings. However, when he began to use an unorthodox approach to cancer therapy, he was suddenly branded a "quack." In the trial against Ivy, a letter from an Indianapolis doctor was read in court and included in the minutes of the trial. This doctor wrote that he was treating a patient with multiple tumors that biopsy showed to be cancerous tumors. From the laboratory of Dr. Ivy Krebiozen and used it, but it hadn't shown the slightest effect. When the doctor was called as a witness, however, his answer was only vague and evasive. He finally collapsed under the pressure of cross-examination and admitted that he had never treated such a patient, never ordered the biopsy in question, and never used Krebiozen once. The whole story was a lie. Why would he have made this false statement? He replied that he had received a letter from an FDA official asking him to sign it. He did this because he wanted to help the agency fight quackery. 13 In September 1963, the FDA issued a report claiming that Krebiozen was essentially creatine, a common substance found in every hamburger. In support of this claim, a photo overlay allegedly showed the superimposition of the spectograms of Krebiozen and Cretin. These were published in Life magazine and other mass media as "indisputable evidence" that Krebiozen was ineffective. When Senator Paul Douglas saw the spectograms, he became suspicious. He therefore asked Dr. Scott Anderson, one of the leading American authorities on the field of spectography, to conduct a study of his own. Using standard analytical methods, Anderson identified 29 differences between the two substances. 16 were chemical and color differences. In the version released by the FDA to the press, the axis had been carefully shifted to give the greatest possible appearance of resemblance. However, when the axis was correctly centered again, the two spectograms were as different as day and night. 14 Even more unfair tactics were used with Laetrile than against 13 Garrison, op. 14 Ibid., Pp. 278-280.

33 Krebiozen. Probably the greatest damage was caused by a pseudo-scientific report by the Cancer Commission of the California Medical Association in 1953. It appeared in the April issue of California Medicine and contained an impressive amount of tables and technical data from which it could be concluded that every aspect of Laetrile had been thoroughly studied. The molecular composition was analyzed, the chemical mode of action investigated, the effect on tumors in rats observed and its effectiveness in human cancer patients determined. The stern conclusion of all this supposedly objective research was: "No satisfactory evidence has been found of a significant cytotoxic effect of Laetrile on cancer cells." For most doctors, the conclusions of this California report suffice. Not one in tens of thousands has ever seen, let alone used, Laetrile. Nonetheless, it is clear to all that Laetrile is ineffective because the California Department of the Cancer Commission of AM A has said so and they have no reason to doubt the reliability of those who carried out the tests. Reporter Tom Valentine interviewed numerous leading cancer specialists to determine their views on Laetrile. He describes a typical reaction as follows: Dr. Edwin Mirand of the Roswell Memorial Hospital in Buffalo, NY, said, “We checked it out, and it's worthless.” When asked if the reputed little cancer care hospital really did Laetrile tested, said Dr. Mirand: "No, we didn't think it was necessary after other reputable agencies tested it and found it to be ineffective in treating cancer." Like all authorities, he was referring to the California Report. ' 5 Others hit the same wall. The professional researcher David Martin reports the following experience: Government Is Suppressing Cancer Control, The National Tattler, March 11, 1973, p. 2.

34 As expected, the cancer specialist in question told me that Laetrile was a "sugar pill". If he had told me that he had used Laetrile experimentally on X patients and found that it was completely ineffective, I might have been impressed. But when I asked him if he had ever used it himself, he said no. When asked whether he had ever traveled abroad to study the experiences he had with Laetrile therapy in Germany, Italy, Mexico, the Philippines and other countries, he also said no. And when I asked him if he had ever done his own study of the pros and cons, he admitted again that it wasn't. He was simply repeating what he had heard from others, who in turn were probably repeating what they had heard from others, going back to the outdated 1953 California Cancer Commission report is about the California Report and what the scientific integrity of the authors is like. Although the report as published in California Medicine was unsigned, the authors were Dr. Ian MacDonald, Head of the Commission, and Dr. Henry Garland, your secretary. MacDonald was a well-known cancer surgeon and Garland radiologist of international repute. Both were in the who'is who. Seven other well-known doctors were members of the commission - including four surgeons, a radiologist and a pathologist - none of whom were significantly involved in drafting the report. Not a single one of them - not even MacDonald or Garland - had ever had their own experiences with Laetrile. They only created evaluations and summaries of the written records of others. Before going into these evaluations and summaries, it should first be remembered that MacDonald and Garland were the doctors who made headlines across the country claiming there was no link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. In an address to the Public Health Section of the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, Garland said on July 9, 1964: 16 Cancer News Journal, January / April 1971, p. 22.

35 According to a currently widespread hypothesis, there is a causal connection between smoking and a whole range of different diseases, from cancer to arteriosclerosis. After having dealt with this question for years and in particular the reported connection with primary bronchial carcinoma , I have come to the judicious conclusion that there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. For many, cigarettes, consumed in moderation, are a better sedative ... Presumably, obesity is a greater health risk to the American population than cigarettes. MacDonald went even one step further. In an article in U.S. News & World Report, he is depicted with a cigarette in hand and quoted as saying that smoking "up to 24 cigarettes a day is a harmless pastime." And then he added: "In a modification of an old proverb you could say: one pack a day and you don't need a doctor for lung cancer." increasing public concerns about lung cancer began to decline. In fact, the tobacco industry had already given A M A the first ten of a total of $ 18 million for "research" into the relationship between smoking and health.The effect of this real flood of money from a source that had a certain - shall we say - "self-interest" in the research results was unbelievable and in no way spoke in favor of the A M A. It turned a relatively simple and straightforward project into a monster of confusion and waste (public money). The AMA's report on Tobacco and Health Research says: At the present time, approximately $ 14 million has been made available [from the tobacco industry] for 203 individual research projects at 90 universities. As a direct result of this "Here's Another View: Tobacco May be Harmless", U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 2, 1957, pp. 85-86.

36 grants, 450 reports were published in scientific journals. 1 8 The report then listed the individual research projects and the respective research objectives. Here are just a few examples: Nicotine receptors in certain cells of the cerebellum. Effect of nicotine on mouse behavior. Link between angina and bronchitis - A study on American and Swedish twin cocks. Overripe syndrome in pregnant rats after nicotine absorption during gestation. Interactions of nicotine, caffeine, and alcohol in squirrel monkeys. Effects of smoking on oxygen transport in the placenta of pregnant ewes. Urinary excretion, tissue distribution, and nicotine breakdown in monkeys and dogs. Physique and mortality of 105,000 Army veterans of World War II. A review of previous reports from the AMA Committee on Tobacco and Health Research reveals no more than five research projects primarily concerned with cancer. One of them was all about laboratory testing, the other was about an experiment to determine whether cigarette smoke could be used to cure skin cancer! Thus, only three projects really deal with a topic of the greatest importance to the public. Three out of 203 are just about 1.5 percent - with which we would have learned a lot about the scientific integrity of the A M A in terms of smoking and cancer. With an investment of no more than eighteen million dollars - really little compared to the advertising budget of the tobacco industry in the same 18 Third Research Conference, Committee for Research on Tobacco and Health, AMA Education and Research Foundation, May 7-9, 1972, P. 4.

For a long time - it was possible to steer the medical research of the A M A away from the central cancer problem and onto hundreds of silly side-war theaters that were supposed to obscure and delay the truth. Blinded by the meteor shower of thousand-dollar bills, the AMA published an editorial in the December 1959 American Medical Association Journal claiming that there was too little evidence to "justify" the assumption that cigarette smoking was the most important contributing factor for the increase in lung cancer. In addition, with its huge research program, A M A made it even more difficult to provide such evidence. Was there any connection between the tobacco industry's $ 18 million for the A M A and the public statements made by MacDonald and Garland, two of their most important representatives in California? Perhaps not, although it was rumored that these gentlemen scientists actually received $ 50,000 for their "testimony". 19 Whether that is true or not is no longer important. What is important, however, is the fact that if their medical advice had been followed, it would clearly have resulted in the suffering and death of many more millions of people. Equally important is the fact that it is the same "experts" whose medical position on Laetrile is repeatedly quoted and followed. An interesting footnote should be added to this story, however. A few years later, Dr. MacDonald in his bed because his cigarette started a fire. Dr. Garland, who had boasted of being a chain smoker from an early age and living proof of the harmlessness of cigarettes, died of lung cancer a few years later. In 1963, ten years after the original California Report was published, the California Department of Health officially "recognized" the results of the obsolete study and adopted them as its own. However, the public did so 19 See The Immoral Banning of Vitamin Bn by Stewart M. Jones, MS, MD, Palo Alto, Calif., January 1974, p. 1. Likewise, Cancer News Journal, January / April 1971, p. 3 .

38 an unexpected favor, because for the first time it published all of the original experiments and studies that formed the basis of the report, thereby making public the evidence showing that MacDonald and Garland had forged their summary of these experiments. In the 1953 report, the authors published the conclusions of Dr. med. John W. Mehl that the release of cyanide from Laetrile is not possible. As will be shown in a later chapter, the release of cyanide on the cancer cell is one of the reasons Laetrile is effective. The claim that cyanide cannot be formed was therefore a severe blow to the credibility of the laetrile theory. Mehl was quoted as saying: "These results are inconclusive and will be the subject of further investigation, but they do not support claims about the effects of Laetrile." However, when the original experiments were published ten years later, a very different matter emerged . Buried under a flood of statistics, tables, and graphs is a document called "Appendix 4 to the Laetrile Report," a laboratory report signed by G. Schroetenboer and W. Wolman. It says: After three hours of reflux, the smell of hydrogen cyanide was detectable ... The hydrogen cyanide was distilled to sodium hydroxide and detected with Prussian blue. 20 This report was dated January 14, 1953, two months before Mehl claimed that no cyanide could be released from Laetrile. Significantly, MacDonald and Garland completely ignored the positive report and emphasized the negative one more strongly. Since then, the release of cyanide has been confirmed multiple times by the AMA's chemical laboratory, the National Cancer Institute's Cell Chemistry Department, and even the California Department of Health - the same Department of Health that later officially declared the original report "true" and took it over as his own. 20 Report by Cancer Advisory Council on Treatment of Cancer with Beta-Cyanogenic Glucosides ("Laetriles"), California Department of Public Health, 1963, Appendix 4, pp. 1-2.

39 MacDonald and Garland also claimed that microscopic examination of tumors in patients treated with Laetrile had shown absolutely no evidence of a positive chemical effect. Ten years later, however, that claim turned out to be a bold lie. Appendix 3 contains the results of two pathologists who unequivocally stated that they had observed anti-tumor effects that could in fact be due to Laetrile. In a document dated December 15, 1952, Dr. med. John W. Budd, for example, states: "Case IM ..., extensive hemorrhagic tumor necrosis ... An interpretation as a chemotherapeutic effect is possible." An autopsy report by JL Zundell of September 10, 1952 also describes two cases in which a tumor-inhibiting effect was clearly observed: M-1 ... This could be a chemical effect, since the cells affected show coalgulation necrosis and pycnosis ... M - 3 ... The tumor cells in the lymph nodes appear to be more degenerate. In my opinion, this may be the possible result of a chemical agent ... Two cases ... showed moderate changes ... which can be interpreted as toxic cell changes due to chemotherapy ... 21 That is clear enough. Yet MacDonald and Garland claim in the California Report simply: "None of the experts observed any sign of cytotoxic changes." 22 This claim was, of course, a lie of gigantic proportions. Even if MacDonald and Garland had not misunderstood the researchers' results, the 1953 report would still be utterly unsuitable as a science judgment against Laetrile, since the doses used in cancer patients were too low to be conclusive. In fact, they were about one-fiftieth of what is commonly used for optimal results. Report by Cancer Advisory Council on Treatment of Cancer with Beta-Cyanogenic Glucosides ("Laetriles"), California Department of Public Health, 1963, Appendix 3, pp. 1-2. Report by Cancer Advisory Council, op.cit., P. 324.

40 In the early days of laetrile research, clinicians used the cautious dosage of only 50 to 100 mg per dose. As confidence grew with experience, these amounts were gradually increased until 1974 when Laetrile was given intravenously at doses of 6,000 to 9,000 mg per day. As a rule, it is necessary to accumulate 5 0 0 0 0 to 7 0 0 0 0 mg over a period of about a week until the patient reports noticeable signs of improvement. In the trials for the California Report, on the other hand, the typical dose was only 50 mg per injection. The maximum single dose was 200 mg and the maximum cumulative dose was only 2000 mg, divided into twelve injections. Five patients received only two injections, another five only received one. It is therefore not surprising that the Californian trials failed to provide conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of Laetrile against cancer. As Dr. Krebs stated at the time, "Nothing is so easy to achieve as failure." Despite all the incredible distortions of the truth and scientific truths, Messrs MacDonald and Garland had to admit on page three of their report: All doctors whose patients have been screened reported improvements in well-being, appetite, weight gain and pain relief ... In an effort to downplay these important results, they added: ... as if these observations provided evidence of a definite therapeutic effect. This remark alone should have disqualified the California Report, because these observations actually belong to the very indications from which the doctor recognizes whether his drug therapy is having an effect or not. 23 Most doctors would be overjoyed if they could achieve an improvement in their cancer patients' wellbeing and appetite, weight gain and, most importantly, a decrease in pain. 23 Current Diagnosis <6 Treatment (Palo Alto: Lange Med. Publications, 1972), p. 902.

41 In the 1970s there was little chance that Laetrile would get a chance to be tested by anyone other than his adversaries. Whenever proponents tried to get an exam permit, they were thrown out. For example, on April 6, 1970, the McNaughton Foundation, funded by Andrew McNaughton, filed an application with the FDA for Phase 1 pre-drug approval. Approval was granted on April 26th. But then, to use the words of a reporter, "all of a sudden all hell broke loose". 24 Apparently the FDA had received a call from an angry and politically influential person with the instruction: "Stop testing!" The next day, the FDA informed the foundation in a second letter that a review of the records had certain "defects «Highlighted in the application for the clinical trial, and extensive additional data was requested within the next ten days. Strangely, this letter was not delivered to the NcNaughton Foundation until May 6th, nine days after it was supposedly written, and the suspicion arose that the letter was written much later and was simply backdated to meet the already hair-raising Ten -Day deadline impossible to make. On May 12, six days after receiving the "deficiency letter," McNaughton received a telegram from the FDA stating that drug approval had been withdrawn. Hoping the FDA would reinstate the review clearance after receiving the additional documents, McNaughton continued to prepare the documents and posted them all on May 15, just nine days after receiving the FDA's order required documents to Washington. The FDA, however, stuck with its rejection. No Laetrile tests. A former senior FDA official told Dr. Dean Burk of the National Cancer Institute said he could not recall a single instance in his 30 years of service requiring a 50-page response to alleged deficiencies in just ten days. And on October 1, 1970, there was no indication in the FDA's handbook of procedures that after a period of only ten days a revocation could be made 24 Don C. Matchan, "Why Won't They Test Laetrile?", Prevention, January 1971, Pp. 149-150.

42 must be pronounced. 25 The whole action was clearly carried out under political pressure as a pretext to prevent the trial of Laetrile. One of the reasons for the revocation of the test permit was that Laetrile could be toxic. The FDA solemnly declared: Although clinical trials prior to approval often state that amygdalin is non-toxic, there is a lack of data to support such non-toxicity ... We consider it risky to limit the initial dose for a long-term (over six and more weeks) human study to be based on a single dose study in mice. It is still risky to initiate human studies until the nature of the toxicity has been clarified in larger animal species. 26 That statement is just incredible. First, as will be shown in a later chapter, the non-toxicity of amgydalin has been known, accepted and undisputed for a hundred years. Second, the medical histories submitted with the request for examination provided further evidence of the safety of Laetrile. And third, the question of toxicity is absurd, because all FDA-approved drugs that are currently used in orthodox cancer therapy are extremely toxic. Refusing to test Laetrile on the grounds that it could be toxic is the height of subtlety. Another reason the FDA refused to approve Laetrile was that the doctors who used it had not clinically documented it in sufficient detail. This, too, was a lame excuse, as no clinical documentation is required for phase 1 studies. In righteous anger, the courageous Dr. Burk of the National Cancer Institute, as follows to Elliot Richardson, the then-US Secretary of State for Health, Education, and Welfare under the FDA: 25 Letter from Dr. Dean Burk to US Secretary of Health Elliot Richardson October 19, 1971; G. Edward Griffin, ed., Private Papers Relating to Laetrile (Westlake Village, CA: American Media, 1997). 26 The Ad Hoc Committee of Oncology Consultants For Review and Evaluation of Amygdalin (Laetrile), FDA, August 12, 1961, pp. 3-4.

43 There is no absolute or unalterable requirement for clinical trials to grant approval for phase 1 clinical trials, although the sponsor is required to provide any information they know about what the McNaughton Foundation will do until Limit of what is currently possible. Dr. Contreras [Mexico] and Dr. Nieper [Germany] was rightly concerned primarily with the treatment of cancer patients with Laetrile and related additional therapies and not with the conduct of a clinical evaluation of Laetrile according to the exact and seamless FDA procedures. If you note that your protocols are inadequate for such a purpose, it is clearly a red herring because, on the one hand, there is no such requirement for phase 1 of the clinical trial and, on the other hand, it has never been claimed that the documentation is adequate. 27 It didn't help. Examination clearance for Laetrile was not granted, regardless of the facts. On September 1, 1971, the FDA announced that the Specialized Committee of Specialists to Examine and Evaluate Laetrile had concluded that there was "no acceptable evidence of therapeutic effect to warrant clinical evaluation." And she also announced that based on these conclusions, Laetrile could no longer be advertised, sold, or even tested in the U S A. 2 8 The California Report continues to be cited ad nauseam by cancer "experts" as one of the most important authorities and serves as the basis for the legal restrictions on Laetrile.In addition, the cancer industry has denied proponents of Laetrile the opportunity to conduct their own clinical trials on such flimsy pretexts that it would be funny if the consequences weren't so serious. All of this is based on prejudice, not objectivity. The reports and explanations are intended to deceive, not to enlighten. We are dealing with commandments, not science. Why is this happening? We come to this part of the story in the next chapter. 27 Letter from Dr. Dean Burk to Elliot Richardson, October 19, 1971, op.cit. 28 Press Release, Department of Health / FDA, September 1, 1971.

Chapter 2 Genocide in Manhattan Further attempts by the cancer industry to prove the worthlessness of Laetrile, embezzlement of laboratory reports from the Sloan Kettering / Institute proving the effectiveness of Laetrile, Rockefeiler and its connection to the pharmaceutical industry, and like a group of Sloan Kettering employees let the world know the truth. there are numerous other studies on N E B E N DEM C A L I F O R N I A - R E P O R T Laetrile by reputedly qualified and respected institutions. These include a 1953 project by Stanford University, a 1961 study by the University of California at Berkeley, another by Diablo Labs in Berkeley from 1962, and a 1965 study carried out by McGill University in Montreal on behalf of the Canadian Medical Association . Each and every one of these studies suffers from the same flaw as the 1953 California Report - scientific incompetence, bias, and blatant delusion. Some of the studies openly admitted indications of an anti-cancer effect, but hastened to attribute this effect to other causes. Some were purely toxicity studies, so they weren't supposed to find out whether Laetrile was working, just how much it would take to kill the patient. In most of these trials, Laetrile's success was only measured in terms of tumor size reduction. This may seem sensible at first, but one should take into account that most tumors are composed of malignant and benign cells and the tumor transplants that are used in laboratory mice only consist of about three to four percent real cancerous tissue. In healthy mice, the more malignant tissues are rejected, so they cannot be successfully transplanted. Even if Laetrile destroyed the cancer 100 percent, these tumors would only shrink by three to four percent at most. The only sensible success criterion is the extension of the survival time, not the reduction of the tumor size.

45 After months of testing Laetrile in mice, the Southern Research Institute in Birmingham, Alabama, wrote a 1973 report on the results for the National Cancer Institute (NCI). The NCI then announced that these examinations had once again shown that Laetrile was not effective in treating cancer. On closer inspection, however, it turned out that the appearance was deceptive. Dr. Burk scrutinized the raw data in the tables and graphs in the report and found that the experiment had worked on three different groups of mice with Laetrile: (1) a large group that received too little Laetrile, (2) another large group that received too much; and (3) a small group that received the optimal dose. The mice that received too little died just as quickly as the mice in the control group that received no Laetrile at all. Those who received too much were more likely to die than those in the control group. But those given the right dosage survived much longer than those not given Laetrile at all! Given these results, one might wonder how the National Cancer Institute could claim that Laetrile was of no value. Quite simply: All three groups were combined in the same statistic - including those with the dose that was too low and that was too high. When these large groups were combined with the small group with the significantly longer survival times, they lowered the average so much that it could be safely said that these mice as a whole did not survive significantly longer than those that had not received Laetrile . The statistics hadn't lied. But the statistics had been used by liars. 1 Meanwhile, the group of recovering cancer patients who sang the praises of Laetrile continued to grow. These patients and their families formed a national grassroots organization called the Committee for Freedom-of-Choice in Cancer Therapy. Several hundred local groups across the country held public meetings and press conferences and gave presentations to the legislative committees of the individual federal states. Dean Burk in a 14-page open letter to Dr. Seymour Perry of the NCI presented a damning analysis of this statistical manipulation. See Private Papers Relating to Laetrile, edited by G. Edward Griffin (Westlake Village, Calif .: American Media, 1997).

46 of the states issued statements calling for Laetrile to be released. One had to react to these "laetrilists" somehow. So in 1978 the National Cancer Institute initiated another study to take away the nimbus of the movement. For this purpose, 93 cancer cases were selected for which the medical documentation indicated that Laetrile was effective. The information was sent to a group of twelve experts for assessment. Cases with conventional therapy were also mixed in, although the experts did not know which patient had received which therapy. The assessment should be based solely on the results. The NCI screened the Laetrile falls and screened most of them so that the experts were only allowed to examine 22 of them. 2 What criteria should one use to evaluate the success of cancer treatment? Survival time? Life quality? Subjective well-being and freedom from pain? Normal functionality in everyday life? All of these criteria are used by doctors who treat cancer with nutritional medicine. They are not concerned with the size of a tumor, because they know that, as mentioned earlier, in most cases a tumor is a mixture of malignant and benign cells, with most of them containing only a small number of cancer cells. Even if Laetrile destroys a patient's cancer 100 percent, their tumor may only decrease by 10 to 15 percent. But who cares? The patient returns to the living. The tumor is not the disease, it is just its symptom. Orthodox medicine, on the other hand, is completely fixated on the tumor. For most oncologists, the tumor is synonymous with cancer. When they operate on it or irradiate it away, they announce to the patient, beaming with joy: “Good news! We got him all over! ”It may be that you have the tumor whole, but do you also have its cause? And did you perhaps disrupt some of the malignant cells during the action, which are now migrating through the body via the bloodstream and implanting elsewhere? Is that perhaps why so many cancer patients die of multiple metastases just a few months after that ridiculous "We got him all over!" Laetrile physicians believe that of all the criteria for success, Ralph Moss, Ph.D., Cancer Therapy; The Independent Consumer's Guide to Non-Toxic Treatment & Prevention (New York: Scribner & Sons, 1959), p. 271.

47 reduction in tumor size is the least significant. And which main criterion did the NCI choose? For the size of the tumor, of course. This was not only in line with the orthodox view of cancer, it also influenced the results in favor of forms of therapy such as chemotherapy and radiation therapy, which shrink the tumor more than Laetrile. A living, healthy patient whose tumor has only shrunk by 15 percent would therefore be a failure. A patient dying of the disease, whose tumor has shrunk by 60 percent, would be a success. Despite this unfair starting position, the experts came to the following conclusion: In the Laetrile cases examined, two patients showed a complete remission (the tumor was completely degraded), four a partial regression (tumor was degraded by more than 50 percent), and nine were "stabilized" (no further tumor growth), and three had "more disease-free times". In other words: 18 out of 22, i.e. H. 82 percent responded positively - even when tumor size was used as a criterion. Few of the “approved” cancer drugs have had such good results. But all of these encouraging numbers did nothing. The official report of the NCI states: "These results do not allow definitive conclusions in favor of an anti-cancer effect of Laetrile." 3 The formulation was wonderfully misleading. No one expected "definitive conclusions" from a single study. But a frank and complete presentation of the results would have been nice. This finely chiseled formulation now gave the impression, however, that Laetrile had once again failed a scientific test. Here words were not used for communication, but for disguise. The next act in this pseudoscience drama was a clinical trial of 178 patients by the Mayo Clinic. Amygdalin was to be tested once again, but this time in combination with a “metabolic therapy” consisting of diet, enzymes and nutritional supplements - exactly what nutritional doctors had advocated. The leading laetrile doctors resisted bitterly, however, because the experimental setup did not compare with their 3 N. M. Ellison, "Special Report on Laetrile: The NCI Laetrile Review. Results of the National Cancer Institute's Retrospective Laetrile Analysis. "New England Journal of Medicine 299: 549-552, Sep. 7, 1978.

48 own exams made possible. In addition, there were considerable doubts about the purity of the amygdalin used. The suspicion arose that the entire experiment was deliberately designed from the outset in such a way that it was bound to fail. And that is exactly what it did. Doctors at the Mayo Clinic reported, "No significant positive effects were seen." This continuous series of scientific illusions is hard to beat, but what happened a few years later at the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in Manhattan , overshadowed everything so far. For five years, from 1972 to 1977, Laetrile was trained at Sloan-Kettering under the direction of Dr. Kanematsu Sugiura thoroughly tested. As a research director with more than 60 years of experience, Sugiura was held in high regard for his competence and integrity. In a science lab that cares about the truth and nothing but the truth, he would have been the right man for the job. For Sloan-Kettering's purposes, however, the choice could not have been less suitable. Sugiura divided his experiments into test series on different test animals and different, partly transplanted, partly naturally occurring tumors. After completing the experiments, he reported the following five results: (1) Laetrile prevented metastasis (the spread of cancer) in mice, (2) it improved their general condition, (3) it inhibited the growth of small tumors, (4) it brought about Pain relief and (5) it was anti-cancer. The official report said: The results clearly show that amygdalin significantly inhibits the occurrence of lung metastases in mice with primary breast tumors and significantly increases the inhibition of primary tumor growth ... Laetrile also seemed to slightly reduce the occurrence of new tumors ... In general, there is always an improvement in the health and appearance of the treated animals compared to the control group ... In his extensive experience with other chemotherapeutic agents, Dr. Sugiura never observed a complete regression of these tumors. 4 4 "A Summary of the Effect of Amygdalin Upon Spontaneous Mammary Tumors in Mice," report by Sloan-Kettering, June 13, 1973.

49 The reader should reread this last paragraph, for we shall see that, just a few months later, Sloan-Kettering spokesmen flatly denied the existence of evidence of Laetrile's worth. In order to really understand and appreciate what happened afterwards, one has to know the background a little better. Sloan-Kettering's board of directors is practically controlled by managers who represent the financial interests of pharmaceutical companies. For the most part, control lies in the hands of the Rockefeller dynasty and their cartel partners. At the time Sugiura ran his tests, there were three men on the board of directors from the Rockefeller dynasty (James, Laurance, and William) and over a dozen men whose businesses were in some way financially related to the Rockefeller empire. How the connection between the Rockefellers and the pharmaceutical industry came about is reported in the second part of this book. But to see how that affects this part of our history, you have to know that John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and his son J.D. II, have made donations to Memorial Hospital since 1927. Among other things, they donated an entire area of ​​land on which the new hospital was built in the 1930s. There was no donation without consideration. In this case it was control of one of the most important medical centers in the world. How that happened, reported Ralph Moss, former Deputy Director of Public Relations at Sloan-Kettering. He wrote about the expansion of Sloan-Kettering after the Second World War: The composition of the foundation's board of directors at that time shows a certain balance of power, with the Rockefellers and their allies in control of the whole thing, while representatives of the Morgans held numerous other positions of power. From that time on, the largest private cancer center was run by a group that looks confusingly like a consortium of Wall Street's major banks and corporations. In the mid-1970s, the MSKCC Foundation Board had taken on a fairly homogeneous appearance. It was noticeable that many of its most important members were people depending on their company

50 had to lose or gain considerable sums of money after the outcome of the "war on cancer". 5 In light of this, it should come as no surprise that Sugiura's research results absolutely not appealing to his employer. The operations in the laboratory are usually quite uninteresting to board members. They assume that whatever happens, a patent will come out for a new drug that will bring new money into their pockets. They were just beginning to understand the consequences of Sugiura's work, but once they got it, all hell broke loose in the boardroom. If an extract from the humble apricot kernel was found to be a cancer cure, it would be a hard blow to the cancer drug industry. Sugiura's work had never been questioned before. In 1962, over 200 of his scientific papers were published in one four-volume edition. In the introduction to this, Dr. C. Chester Stock, Head of Laboratory Testing at Sloan-Kettenring: Hardly any other name in cancer research is as well known as Kanematsu Sugiura's ... The high reputation that his work enjoys is perhaps best in one Comment on the expression that a Russian cancer researcher who was visiting the United States made to me. He said, “If Dr. Sugiura publishes something, we know we don't have to repeat the study because our results would be congruent with his. ”Now that Sugiura's results posed a financial threat, all that was forgotten. The same Dr. Stock, who wrote these lines, was now Vice President of Sloan-Kettering and part of the pack that loudly demanded new tests. Sugiura simply had to be refuted! It turned out that Sugiura's experiments had already been duplicated by several others who had obtained essentially the same positive results. These included, on the one hand, Dr. Elizabeth Stocken and, on the other hand, Dr. Lloyd Schloen. Both were biochemists and at the time of this work were employees of Sloan-Kettering. Schloen even added proteolytic enzymes to the injections - one from Ralph Moss, The Cancer Syndrome (New York: Grove Press, 1980), p. 258.

51 Laetrile doctors frequently used procedure - and reported a cure rate of 100 percent in his Swiss albino mice! 6 That was not the desired result at all; on the contrary, it was extremely embarrassing. It would have been so nice to have been able to simply let these reports disappear into a deep hole and pretend they never existed. But it was too late for that. They were already published and too many people knew the facts. So it was time to bury all of these results under a mountain of reports and statistics to the contrary. In a heap of rubbish, a rose will not stand out, no matter how nice it smells.Nothing in the world is so easy to achieve as failure. It is not difficult to block the effects of Laetrile. All you have to do is change the test plan a little, lower the dosage, get the material from a different supplier, change the evaluation criteria, make procedural errors and, if that's not enough, lie. All of these tricks were used to discredit Sugiura's results. If you don't want to believe that scientists can lie about such important issues, remember that in 1974 Sloan-Kettering was the scene of one of the greatest scientific scandals of the 20th century. Dr. William Summerlin, one of the institute's lead researchers, claimed to have discovered a method that could prevent the recipient from rejection of foreign tissue during transplants. To prove it, he demonstrated white mice with square black spots on their fur, claiming that skin transplants from black mice would now be tolerated by the white ones. - Are you kidding me? Are you serious when you say that. He had drawn the black spots with a marker pen. 7 As well as success, failure can also be faked. Dr. Until then, Daniel S. Martin of the Catholic Medical Center in Queens, New York, had not been able to get positive results with Laetrile, but he had worked according to a different experimental plan than Sugiura. To fix this problem, Sugiura was asked to collaborate on a second series of experiments by Martin, which he did. This time, however, the results were positive for Laetrile. 6 Ralph Moss, The Cancer Syndrome (New York: Grove Press, 1980), p. 139. 7 See Joseph Hixon, The Patchwork Mouse; Politics and Intrigue in the Campaign to Conquer Cancer (New York: Anchor Press / Doubleday, 1976).

The visual examination showed that twice as many new tumors appeared in the mice not treated with Laetrile as in the Laetrile mice. The next step in Sugiura's experimental design would have been to perform a microscopic examination of the lung tissue (where the cancer was located) to determine the extent of tumor growth upon completion of the experiment. However, Martin was against visual or microscopic examinations and instead insisted on a so-called bioassay. In this bioassay the lung tissue of the mouse was minced and then two more mice were injected. If any of them developed cancer, the tissue injected was presumed to have been cancerous tissue. This blurred the spread between great improvement, little improvement, or no improvement at all. No matter how much the cancer was weakened, no matter whether it was gradually completely destroyed by Laetrile, as long as there were any cancer cells left to transfer to living mice, the case was classified as a failure. Since the original mice were killed before Laetrile could have been active for any length of time, it was ensured that cancer cells were still present in practically all of them. Consequently, they were all classified as Laetrile failure. Without moving an expression, Dr. Martin announce in this method that no differences were found between treated and control mice. Once again science has been misused to hide the truth. Meanwhile, a group of Sloan-Kettering employees became so angry with management's attempts to cover up Sugiura's findings that they circulated several open letters to the public under the name of Second Opinion. The identity of the authors was not known, but it was clear from the information published that they were closely related to the company. Photocopies of important internal memos - even copies of Sugiura's laboratory records - were sent to Laetrile supporters and select members of the press. These broadsides became a source of embarrassment for management, who were keen to close the case and make it fade in the minds of the public. One of the most outspoken advocates of this line was Benno Schmidt, the Stellver- 10 Moss, Cancer Syndrome, op. Cit., P. 147.

53 incumbent chairmen of Sloan-Kettering. Schmidt was an investment banker and had connections with all the important people. He was a close friend of Laurance Rockefeller, a member of the SK board and chairman of President Carter's National Panel of Consultants for the Conquest of Cancer. This is the body that came up with the so-called "war on cancer," which subsequently turned out to be mainly a means of providing research centers like Sloan-Kettering with billions in taxpayers' money. For Schmidt, the purpose of testing Laetrile was solely to convince the public of its ineffectiveness. Whether it worked or not didn't matter. This fact came to light - no doubt completely unintentional - in an interview with Dr. Martin, which appeared in the December 23, 1977 issue of Science. When asked by the journalist whether the tests at Sloan-Kettering were primarily intended for scientists, Martin replied, “Nonsense. Of course, they were used to provide people like [Benno] Schmidt and the congressmen with arguments against the Laetril people. “Not to advance science, not to test a possible cure for cancer, not to tell the truth to find out - to collect "arguments against the Laetrilleute"! In a statement published in Medical World News on August 11, 1975, Schmidt said, “Clinical testing? No way! I think it's impossible to convince the people at Sloan-Kettering that there is a basis for further experimentation. ”When the vice chairman says something is impossible, it usually is. But the buzz caused by the publication of Second Opinion forced the strategists not to close the matter for the time being and to be fair and open. And what could have been fairer than another test? So the matter went to the next round. On October 6, less than four weeks after there was "no basis for further testing," Medical World News published another article stating that a new round of testing had been scheduled. It said: “He [Sugiura] will have another opportunity to do a joint experiment with Dr. Schmid to check [his] opinion. "